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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CONNIE LOU SWITZER, RAYMONE
GORDON SWITZER, DONALD EUGENE
SWITZER, RODNEY DEAN SWITZER,
and THEREASE JO SWITZER, minors
by and through their Guardian ad
litem, LOUELLA R. BOWLES,
I

Case No. 15712
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.
BRYCE C. REYNOLDS, individually
and formerly doing business as
REYNOLDS SAND AND GRAVEL COMPANY;
CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Construction Machinery Division, and
FOULGER EQUIPMENT COMPANY,
Defendants/Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Appeal from Judgment of Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah
Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge

c.

R. Henriksen, Esq.
Jcel H. Dembinsky, Esq.
320 South Fifth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Appellants

John H. Allen, Esq.
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113
Attorney for Respondent Reynolds
Richard H. Moffat, Esq.
9th Floor Tribune Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent Clark Equipment Company
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i.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This action is for the wrongful death of Gordon Switzer
who died as the result of an accident on June 24, 1963, and is
brought pursuant to Section 78-11-7 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended.

Mr. Switzer was killed while operating a Model 175A,

Clark Michigan Front End Loader (the loader) •

This suit was

brought by Louella R. Switzer Bowles, the widow of the deceased
on behalf of the five Switzer Children.
At the time of the death of their father, all five children
were minors, ranging in age from one month to 6-1/2 years.
was brought against Bryce C. Reynolds,

Suit

(Reynolds), formerly doing

business as Reynolds Sand and Gravel, the employer of the decedent,
and owner of the loader; Foulger Equipment Company,

(Foulger) as

the seller to Reynolds of the loader; and Clark Equipment Company,
(Clark) the manufacturer of the loader.

On September 7, 1977,

plaintiffs and Foulger settled their differences and a stipulation
and order of dismissal with prejudice was entered.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Suit was filed on October 23, 1974.

From that date until

October 3, 1977, intensive discovery was conducted by the plaintiffs
in preparing their case for trial. During that nearly three-year
period, 17 depositions were taken, numerous motions were argued
before the court and the case had been set for trial four times.
the last of which was October 3, 1977.

Plaintiff was ordered at one

of those hearings to pay the full amount of defendant's costs and
attorney's fees of $70.00 per hour in connection with certain discovery which effectively prevented plaintiffs' discovery and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-2notice of intent to appeal was filed.

The court failed to rule

on plaintiffs' motions for costs and attorney's fees in connecti:
with two motions to compel discovery against Clark Equipment
Company.

On August 15, 1977, Clark Equipment Company filed a

Motion to Dismiss based on the ground that plaintiffs' cause of
action expired by the Statute of Limitations, Section 78-12-28,
U.C.A.

(1953; as amended).

On August 31, 1977 defendant Reynold:

filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there wa:
no genuine issue as to any material fact.

On September 7, 1977,

defendant Reynolds filed a brief in support of his Motion to Dis·
miss alleging that the defendant committed no acts of negligence,
that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that
the plaintiffs' claim has been discharged in bankruptcy.

Argume:

was had on thepending motions on September 16, 1977, and on Janu:
17, 1978, the judge granted defendants' motions.

Plaintiffs

~e

appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs/Appellants seek reversal of the District Court':
surrunary judgment and, ruling on motions and remand for trial on
the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 24, 1963, Gordodon Switzer was an adult male, in''.
heal th and working for Bryce C. Reynolds, formerly doing busine:
as Reynolds Sand & Gravel Company.

He was instructed to drive:

Clark Equipment Company front-end loader, Model 17 SA,

(the loade

down the State Highway in Parley's Canyon from a point near Kirr~
Junction to Reynolds' main pit in Salt Lake City.

Just above~
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-3Mountain Dell Reservoir Dam the machine tipped over on Switzer,
killing him almost instantaneously.

The only eye witness to

the incident, Mr. Jack Thompson, testified that he was driving
slowly uphill at the time, that he saw the incident clearly and
that Gordon Switzer appeared to have no problem with the machine
but that he drove it across the highway and that the machine then
tipped over •.
Shortly after Switzer's death, a claim was filed with the
Utah State Industrial Commission, Workmen's Compensation Division,
but the Department determined that Bryce C.Reynolds, the employer,
was not covered.

Shortly before Switzer's death, the defendant

Reynolds had been operating under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act.
He subsequently amended his petition to include a claim by Louella
R. Switzer. Suit was filed on October 23, 1974 by Louella R.
Switzer Bowles as guardian ad litem for the five minor children of
the decedent.

Reynolds filed an answer alleging discharge in bank-

ruptcy and the running of the statute of limitations, Section 70A12-28, U.C.A.

(1953, as amended).

Clark filed an answer alleging

the statute of limitations had run but did not allege any specific
section of the Utah Code.
Motions were argued on September 16, 1977, and on January
17, 1978, the judge entered his order.

Plaintiffs urged the court

to consider the long-pending motion for the award of attorney's
fees and expenses in connection with certain discovery compelled
from Clark Equipment Company.

The judge declined to rule on the

motion, granted summary judgment for defendants, and this appeal
was instituted.
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-4A R G U M E N T

POINT I.
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND IT WAS
ERROR TO GRANT DEFENDANT REYNOLDS' AND CLARK'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 56(c) UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 56 (_c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to Interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Before summary judgment can be properly granted, it is
necessary that judgment be free from doubt and that as a remed1,
summary judgment should be granted with great caution.

Green v,

Garm, 11 Ut.2d 375, 359 P.2d,1050; Henry v. Washiki Club, Inc.
11 Ut. 2d 1138, 355 P.2d 973; Watkins v.Simmons, 11 Ut. 2d 46, •
P.2d 852.
The plaintiffs' theory of liability against defendants CL
and Reynolds specifically stated in their answers to Clark's

a~:

Reynolds' interrogatories supplemented answers which were serve:
on the 8th day of February, 1977, provides in pertinent part:
Defects in the design of the brake system in providing
inadequate brake capacity, failure to provide fail-safe
system; design of the steering system in creating a
vehicle which was apparently unstable under certain
conditions; failure to provide fail safe power steering
assist systems; failure to provide warnings to operators
of the brake and steering defect design deficiency;
failure to provide adequate roll-over protective structures ....
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-5The answer continues:
(a)

Inadequate brake capacity or inadequate power
brake assist for the tractor's shovels intended
foreseeable and actual use.

(b)

Inadequate power steering assist for excessive
effort unless engine speed was kept up.

(c)

Design of engine declutching mechanism which
operates whenever brakes are applied. Effect
of said mechanism is to: Eliminate engine
braking, reduce power steering assist by reduction of engine speed, enhance power steering
pump speed; reduce power brake assist by reduction in engine speed, enhance power brake vacuum
speed, and . . .

(g)

Failure to provide warnings to the operator of the
above defects;

(h)

Failure to provide adequate instructions to the
operator about emergency situations and in particular about defect (c) above.

(i)

Failure to restrict use of vehicle to its safe
uses.

In addition, as to Reynolds, the answers state:
(j)
Violation of Utah Statute:
41-6-111, Coasting
Prohibited; 41-6-117 Vehicle in Unsafe Condition; 41-6-144 Brake Equipment; 41-6-155 Requirement that Vehicle be in Safe Mechanical
Condition; 35-1-12 Places of Employment to be
Safe; 35-1-46 Failure to Secure compensation;
and 35-1-57 Non-Compliance-Penalty.
The primary thrust of liability against defendant Reynolds
is because of Reynolds' failure to have in effect at the time of
Switzer's death workmen's compensation insurance.

That failure

reverses the normal burden of proof and makes the defendant prove
he was not negligent.

Section 35-1-57,

u.c.A.

(1953, as amended),

above, states in pertinent part:
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-6In any such action the defendant shall not avail himsei:
of any of the following defenses:
Defense of the fella·,.
servant rule; Defense of assumption of risk or the defer.:
of contributory negligence.
Proof of the injury shall~
stitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the parts'
the employer to show freedom from negligence resulting~:
such injury.
Reynolds has adrni tted that Gordon Switzer was employed t
at the time of his death and that he was acting in the scope o:
employment.

Based on the presumption created by failure to sec

workmen's compensation, i t is the duty of Reynolds to show tha:
was not negligent.

The affidavits which Reynolds submitted dm

only with the operation of the machine subsequent to the accide
The affidavits submitted are not inconsistent with plaintiff's:
of design defects in the brake and steering system, and certak
not reach the standard of proof required for the granting of
mary judgment.

s~

The evidence on file clearly shows, or indicat:'

that the machine in question, even if properly maintained, couL
not comply with Utah statutes dealing with brake performance.
As specifically alleged, the brake equipment was not capat
meeting the standard set by Section 41-6-144, U.C.A.
amended).

(1953, as

The section provides that for any motor vehicle oper·

ated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to
control the movement of and to stop and hold vehicle.

For the

loader which weighed some 24,000 pounds, a stopping distance of
40 feet or a deceleration of 14 feet per second or the equiva~
braking force in percentage of vehicle or combination weight of
43.5%.

And yet, Walter Black, the chief safety engineer for

Clark, testified that even at 1500 pounds per square inch in Wo
braking system and 175 pounds on the brake pedal, the machiM
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7would only stop at 8 feet per second, about half of the statutory
minimum.

Moreover, Clark's own information provided in response

to discovery, namely, their Drawing No. KXB-76462 shows a 1500 pounds
per square inch is the maximum which the brake system is capable.
Thus, Clark's own expert has testified the brakes were only about
half as good as the minimum legal requirement.

Moreover, the defect

in the brake system is corroborated by the deposition of Mr. Keith
Perry.

At the relevant period in time, Mr. Perry was a service

manager of the defendant Foulger Equipment Company.

Mr. Perry testi-

fied that he was in charge of maintaining this machine and that it
was reconditioned.

He testified further that the machine had all

required service done on i t and that Clark Equipment Company's parts
and procedures and methods were used at all times.

Mr. Perry fur-

ther testified that he checked the brakes approximately one week
before and one week after the accident and that everything on this
machine appeared to be okay but that it was incapable of skidding
the tires on dry pavement.

The evidence on file further shows

that there were no skid marks at the point where the machine tipped
over.
Plaintiff has also alleged that the steering design was
defective.

The defects exist on all similar machines even if

properly maintained.

The loader had power steering which used

an engine-driven pump to force hydraulic oil into a steering
cylinder.

One defect was a pump which was too small and used

excessive steering effort to steer the loader at low vehicle
speeds.

A second and concealed defect is a declutching valve in
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-8the transmission.

When the brakes are used the brake pressure

automatically shifts the machine into neutral, declutching the
engine from the wheels.

This is described in the Clark Operat:

Manual No. 1169 in Section 200, pages 2 and 3:
This valve is connected to the brake system master cylfoc,
by a hydraulic line.
When the wheel brakes are applied,
brake fluid enters the valve and overcomes the spring
force.
This force is to slide to shift over and block
pressure from entering the directional clutches.
In this
manner a "neutral" is established without moving the con·
trol levers.
When Switzer stepped on the brakes as Jack Thompson's
sition indicates, the steering effort became
or contributing to Switzer's death.

de~·

excessive, causir.:

There is no evidence that

defendant Reynolds furnished any warnings to Switzer of either
these defects and since it is his duty under the presumption er;
under the workmen's compensation law to prove he was free from
negligence, it is improper to grant summary judgment.
It is a policy of law to favor trial on the merits and to
afford both sides full opportunity to present their evidence ar.:
citations as to disputed issues so they may be disposed of on
stantial rather than technical grounds.

s~

McKean v. Mountain Vie .

Memorial Estates, 17 Ut.2d 323, 411 P.2d 129

(1966).

When the burden of proof is shifted to Reynolds, the stat:
stopping distance, the deposition of Clark's own expert, thed(
si tion of Keith Perry, and the inference that Switzer was free'
negligence, are construed together, it is apparent that a genu 1:
issue of material fact does exist for submission to the jury.
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-9POINT II.
DEFENDANTS CLARK AND REYNOLDS ARE BARRED AND ESTOPPED
FROM ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BECAUSE OF
FAILURE TO PLEAD THE PROPER SECTION OF THE UTAH CODE
IN A TIMELY MANNER.
Neither defendant Clark nor defendant Reynolds have pleaded
the appropriate statutory section in their answer.

Defendant Clark

in their answer pled only that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by
the Utah Code and cited no statutory section.

Defendant Reynolds

pled specifically that plaintiffs' claim was barred by Section
70-12-28, U.C.A.

(1953 as amended).

If any statute of limitations

applies it would be Section 78-12-28 U.C.A.
Utah law is settled on this point.

(1953, as amended).

The statute must be pleaded.

Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 78 Ut. 158, 2 P.2d 107; Utah Delaware
Mining Co., v. Industrial Conunission, 76 Ut. 187, 289 P.94.

More-

over, Utah holds that the statute must be pleaded in proper time and
manner and that only the section pleaded is effective and further
that if the statute is not pleaded correctly it cannot be relied
on.

American Theater Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Ut. 303, 80 P.2d 922.
Also in accord is In Re Linfords' Estate, 207 P.2d 1033,

where the court overruled the lower court's sustention of a
demurrer, stating at page 1034:
It has long been the law in the state that a
demurrer on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by the statute of limitations which does
not state the section of the code relied upon is
insufficient.
Furthermore, neither defendant has not plead the statute
of limitations with sufficient clarity to identify the section
and subsection relied upon as required by Rule 9 (h) Utah Rules
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-10of Civil Procedure, because of the inadequate plea, it should
not, therefore, be considered on appeal.
v. Hopkinson,

Wasatch Mines Compar.;'

465 P.2d 1007.

In pleading the statute of limitations, it is not necess:
to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged;;
ally that the cause of action.is barred by the provisions of

e

statute relied upon, referring to or describing such statute s;,
fically and definitely by section number, subsection designati:
if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon suf:
clearly to identify it.

If such allegation is controverted,

~

party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the fr
showing that the cause of action is so barred.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that neither Clark nor
Reynolds can rely upon the statute of limitations.
In addition, equitable estoppel in a proper case may be
invoked to prevent defendants from relying on the statute. Thro.
almost three years of discovery and court hearing, neither dek·
dant acted to have the plaintiffs' Complaint dismissed for run:.
of the statute of limitations.
costly, and time consuming.

This case has been unduly cornpl 0

Through all of this, and after

three trial settings, the defendants still did not act to asser:
their alleged right.

In fact, it was not until six weeks befor'

the fourth trial date that defendants filed their motion and nc:
until two weeks prior to trial that the motions were argued.
Had the trial not been vacated for other problems with the
docket, the two-week scheduled trial would have been had. Clear:
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this is not the purpose of the statute of limitations.

Further-

more, previous orders of the court indicated that the parties
were to take all proper steps to dispose of the case as soon as
possible.

Quoting in pertinent part from an order of the court

dated April 29, 1976, almost a year and a half prior to the court
trial setting:
certain parties have not acted expedidi tiously to move this matter towards trial."

It is clear the statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense which must be brought to the attention of the court in
a timely and appropriate manner.

The doctrine of equitable

estoppel has been recognized in several cases.

In the case of

Weir v. Bauer, 75 Ut. 498, 286 P. 936, the court recognized the
doctrine in a case of a corporation with a large stockholder.
The doctrine was also recognized in the case of Rice v. Granite
School District, 23 Ut.2d 22, 456 P.2d 159, involving the injury
due to a fall from a bleacher.

Reversing a motion for summary

judgment for defendant the court said that plaintiff's failure to
act in a timely manner was due to wrongful representations and
misleading statements of the defendants.

Again the doctrine

was recognized in the case of Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
522 P.2d 1252.

The court upheld the doctrine even though it

was the plaintiff's attorney who was lulled into inaction.

In

this case, the plaintiffs have expended vast al!lounts of time and
money in preparing their case for trial and through all of this
in the numerous court hearings the defendants have not acted to
move forward their motion based on the affirmative defense of the
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-12statute of limitations.

Clearly, where there is an affirmati';

duty to bring the statute of limitations to the court's atten:
in a timely manner, the failure to do so should invoke the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM HAS NOT BEEN DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY
A.

Statement of Facts:
Reynolds' petition in bankruptcy was filed on May 2, 1%

and Reynolds was discharged in bankruptcy on August 30, 1968.
Plaintiffs' claim arose on the date of Gordon Switzer's death·
a claim for benefits with Utah State Industrial Commission on
July 6, 1963.

Plaintiffs commenced this action against Reyno),'

in October 1974.
Title II, Section 35 of the Bankruptcy Act provides that
A discharge in bankruptcy releases a bankrupt
from all his provable debts.
Title II, Section 103 lists the debts which may be

pr~~

and allowed against a bankrupt's estate - said act provides in
part as follows:
A-1
"A fixed liability, as evidenced by a
judgment or an instrument in writing absolutely owing at the time of the filing of
the petition by or against him, whether then
payable or not, with any interest thereon
which would have been recoverable at the
date or with a rebate of interest when such
as were not then payable and did not bear
interest . .
A-5 "Provable debts reduced to judgments
after the filing of the petition and before
the consideration of the bankrupt's application for a discharge, less costs incurred
and interest accrued after the filing of the
petition and before the consideration of the
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bankrupt's application for a discharge, less
costs incurred and interest accrued after the
filing of the petition and up to the time of
the entry of such judgments."
A-6
"An award of an industrial accident commission, body, or officer of any state having
jurisdiction to make awards of workmen's compensation in case of injury or death from
injury, if such injury occurred prior to adjudication."
A-7
"The right to recover damages in any
action for negligence instituted prior to
and pending at the time of the filing of the
petitionin bankruptcy.
"
On the date Reynolds filed a petition in bankruptcy and on the
date of adjudication and discharge,· no action had been commenced
for the recovery of damages by plaintiffs.

An unliquidated claim

with the Industrial Commission was pending on the date of adjudication only.
Unliquidated claims for tort are not provable in bankruptcy.
Pindel v. Holgate
Talcott v. Friend
affd 228 U.S. 27,
S. Ct. 505; Brown
(CA 3) 149 F. 48;
174 Minn. 89, 218
Winfree v. Jones,
11) A.L.R. 851.

(CA9) 221 F. 342;
(CA7) 179 F 676,
57 L. Ed. 718, 33
v. United Button Co.
Poznanovic v. Gilardine,
N.W. 244, 57 A.L.R. 148;
104 Va 39, 51 SE 153;

Only provable debts are discharged in bankruptcy:
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 49 L.
Ed. 147, 25 s. Ct 9; Audubon v. Shufeldt,
181 U.S. 575, 45 L. Ed. 1009, 21 S. Ct 735.
Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S.
718, 33 S. Ct 505, affd (CA
Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S.
147, 25 s. Ct 9; Brookhaven
v. Gwin (CA 5 Miss), 253 F.
v. Hibbard, 54 NH 504.

27, 57 L. Ed.
7) 179 F. 676;
176, 49 L. Ed.
Bank & Trust Co.
2d 17; Eastman

Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 81 L. Ed. 827,
57 S. Ct 543.
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As an exception thereto, the Bankruptcy Act, Section 6J
makes provable debts of the bankrupt founded upon the right '.
damages in any action for negligence v,rhere the action is

.ins:

prior to and pending at the time of the filing of the petitio:
bankruptcy.
Neither this action, nor the claim filed with the Indus:
mission were instituted and pending prior or pending when
Reynolds filed in bankruptcy on May 2, 1963.

The

earliest~

a claim for damages in negligence could have been instituted,
June 24, 1963.

The claim filed with the Industrial Commissior

never processed to conclusion and no award was ever made and.
was unliquidated.
A tort claim is not provable (and therefore not dischar:
able) unless it falls within a specific statutory category (Se
tion 63

(A) (7}).

Goldsmith v. Overseas Scientific Corp.
(PC N4l 188 F. Supp. 530.
A claim which is not provable because it is not in exist,
at the time of filing of the petition in bankruptcy is not dis·
charged.
Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 81 L. Ed.
827, 57 S. Ct 543.
In addition, the Swi tzers' claim was not discharged beca.
of Reynolds' failure to properly schedule the Swi tzers' addres:
and therefore give notice of the bankruptcy proceeding.

Tit!'

II, Section 25 of the Bankruptcy Act provides in pertinent

~r

. (8) prepare, make oath to, and file in court
within five days after adjudication, if an involuntary
bankrupt, and with his petition, if a voluntary bankrupt, a schedule of his property, the location thereof
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-15and its money value, in detail; and a list of all his
creditors, including all persons asserting contingent
unliquidated, or disputed claims, showing their residence or places of business, if known, or if unknown
that fact to be stated .
(emphasis added)
Yet in Reynolds' amended schedule of September 15, 1965, the
address of the Switzers is given as:
c/o Industrial Commission of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
While the address given may have been sufficient to discharge a claim by the Industrial Commission, it is not as to
Switzers.

In point of fact, Mrs. Switzer listed her address as

3211 South Second West, Salt Lake City, Utah in July 6, 1963,

when she filed application with the Industrial Commission.

Sub-

sequent correspondence with the Industrial Commission indicates
an address of 477 Moore, Pontiac, Michigan, on January 11, 1965.
In September 1965 Reynolds did not send notice to either the
correct city or state.

Such defective notice is ineffective as

to the Swi tzers.
Bucci v. LaRocca, 21 N.J. 316, 33 ATL (2d) 878;
Van Denburgh v. Goodfellow, 19 Col. (2d) 217,
120 P.2d 20; Salmon v. Sarno, 37 N.Y. 2d 870.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFFS WERE PREVENTED NECESSARY DISCOVERY BY
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER AND BY FAILURE OF THE TRIAL
COURT TO RULE ON MOTIONS TO AWARD PLAINTIFFS THEIR
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
A.

Statement of Facts:
On August 27, 1976, plaintiffs served upon defendant Clark

interrogatories and a request for production numbered 18 through
23.

On October 14, 1976, Clark served its answers and partial
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response to plaintiffs' request for production.

In answer to

No. 19, Clark objected to the production for inspection and
copying of records on all loaders similar to the one involved
in this lawsuit on the grounds that the request for production
was too burdensome.

Pursuant to motion and notice of hearing

served December 10, 1976, hearing was had before the Honorable
Marcellus K. Snow on December 17, 1976 on request No. 19 and
several other matters.

Due to the length of the file, Judge

declined to rule on plaintiffs' motion.

s~c

Clark did furnish certa

other information which re so 1 ved the other problems.

Plain tiff:

motion was again noticed for hearing on February 11, 1977 at a
scheduled pretrial conference.
had.

The pretrial conference was not

The unresolved motion was again brought to the court's at·

tention on March 30,' 1977, and on May 7, 1977.

On May 25, 197i,

plaintiffs' motion was finally denied with leave to resubmit.
On May 27, 1977 the motion was argued again and plaintiff was pe
mi tted the inspection provided that they pay to Clark their att
ney's fees in advance -

$70.00 an hour.

On June 16, 1977, plair·

tiffs filed notice of preservation of rights on appeal.

In add:

on September 16, 1977, plaintiffs served upon defendant Clark a
demand for production of certain documents which would include:
records referred to above.

Clark objected to the demand for pre

duction and argument was had on the demand on that date.

The

court considered the matter but did not rule on it.
A second matter relating to discovery concerns the de~
s i tions of Walter L. Black and M. L. Conrad, the former being'
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-17present employee of Clark and the latter being a former employee
of Clark.

Plaintiffs noticed up the depositions of the two in-

dividuals at Benton Harbor, Michigan, the home office of Clark,
for June 27, 1977.

On May 12, 1977, Clark filed a motion for

protective order asking for, among other things, that said discovery may be had only upon plaintiffs paying the cost of transportation and per diem for the defendant Clark Equipment Company's
attorney to attend a taping of said deposition in Benton Harbor,
Michigan.

The motion was noticed up for May 25, 1977, and at the

hearing on that date, plaintiffs were ordered to pay Clark that
travel expense in advance.

Following the hearing of May 27, 1977,

the protective order was modified but not in any respect altering
the payment of travel expenses.

On June 20, 1977, plaintiffs

amended the notice of taking of depositions of Biack and Conrad
to June 30, 1977.

On June 29, 1977, ex parte and without notice,

Clark Equipment applied to the court for a modification of the
protective order and that modification was granted.

The modifica-

tion prevented plaintiff from asking any opinions or conclusions
of the witnesses on the basis they were not discoverable.
modification is not a subject of this appeal.

That

The depositions

were taken on June 30, 1977 pursuant to the amended notice.
The third subject dealing with discovery is the award of
certain costs and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs for Clark's
failure to comply with discovery.

On September 12, 1975, plain-

tiffs served upon Clark their set of interrogatories.
a general objection in October 1975.

Clark filed

On April 27, 1976, the inter-

rogatories were stricken on Rule 11 motion made by defendant Clark.
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-18On April 28, 1976, Clark stipulated it would answer or object
to the stricken interrogatories within 30 days without requir:
re-service of those interrogatories.

On May 24, 1976, Clark

served its answers but its objections were not signed by the
attorney as required by Rule 33A.

On June 10, 1976, plaintif'

served their motion, notice and memorandum to compel defendant
Clark to answer the interrogatories propounded by plaintiffs
and, more specifically, to compel answers over the objections
previously filed by Clark.

Hearing was had on June 18, 1976,

Plaintiffs submitted a 7-page memorandum in support of their
motion.

On the day scheduled for hearing, defendant Clark

d~

not appear and plaintiffs obtained an order requiring Clark tc
supplement their answers within 30 days.
On July 12, 1976, Clark filed a motion to extend time to
answer the interrogatories and noticed that up for hearing on
August 12, 1976.
andum.

That motion being supported by a 7-page memo:

Pursuant to agreement between the parties, the August

12, 1976 hearing was continued without date and Clark subseque·
filed a second supplemental answers to interrogatories.
Plaintiff served another set of interrogatories on Clark
on March 18, 1977, and when the 30 days to answer or

object~

Plaintiffs filed its motion and 9-page memorandum for an order
pelling Clark to answer those interrogatories on April 21, 19'
The matter was noticed up for hearing on May 9, 1977, and at:
time Clark stipulated it would answer the interrogatories to·.
extent information was available and the pretrial order of thr
date so reflects.
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-19On the 18th day of July, 1977, plaintiffs filed a motion
to determine unresolved questions prior to trial and a motion
for protective order on their expert witness, Dr. Rudolf Limpert
of the University of Utah.
1977.

The motions were noticed for July 27,

Pursuant to the further pretrial hearings held on July 27,

1977, the court heard arguments on plaintiffs' motions for costs
and expenses and in paragraph 10 of that order, the court took
under advisement its judgment on plaintiffs' motion.

The trial

court never rules on that motion.
B.

Argument:
The general rule is that each party pay their own expenses

unless there are some unusual circumstances which dictate transfer
of expenses from one party to another.

The court abused its dis-

cretion in awarding Clark its expenses for travel, lodging, reproduction and use of viewer, plus $70.00 per hour legal fees
prior to taking the depositions of their experts in Benton Harbor,
Michigan on June 30, 1977.

While it is proper in certain instances

that protective orders issued under Rule 26(c-2) may provide for
the transfer of such expenses, exceptional circumstances are required before that is justified.

In this case, these were the

only true people the court had designated as having any knowledge
of the subject machine.

They had been requested to furnish the

names of witnesses which would be called to trial but at that time
and even subsequent to that time, Mr. Conrad and Mr. Black were
the only two witnesses known to plaintiffs. Benton Harbor, Michigan
is Clark's home office.

To require plaintiffs to pay both their

own expenses and Clark's attorney's expenses in connection with
that motion was an abuse of discretion.
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-20Stated in Continental Casualty Company v. Houdry Process
Corp., 18 Frd 75

(1955) at page 76:

this court has generally been reluctant
to impose charges of this kind upon the party taking
the depositions and will usually rule that the parties
should bear their own expenses unless the circumstances
are such as to indicate strongly that discretion should
be exercised to the opposite effect."
In making the ruling the court noted that both sides required the testimony of the witnesses.

That certainly is the ca

here since these were the only witnesses known by Clark

havi~·

direct or inside information on these particular machines. Int
argument, Clark advanced no reasons why such expenses should be
paid other than the fact that these witnesses did, in fact, res:
in Benton Harbor, Michigan, but it was Clark's choice to do bus:
ness in Utah and to submit to the jurisdiction of the Utah cour:
Weighing the burden against a large corporation such as Clark E:
ment against plaintiffs' financial resources, clearly there is:
reason in equity why plaintiffs should have to bear the burden·
Clark's expenses also.

Since Rule 2 6 ( c) provides that the moti:

of the party requiring a protective order shall show good cause,
the court abused its discretion where Clark submitted no logica:
reasonable or equitable reason why plaintiffs should pay the~
travel expenses.

The court below should be ordered to reverse·

prior order.
Second point is that plaintiffs were effectively prevente:
discovery of the only known records dealing with th is kind of
machine by being ordered by the trial court to pay Clark's aU 1
$70. 00 an hour in advance to inspect certain business records::
Clar,.

Plaintiffs made numerous efforts through interrogaton'
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-21to discover information reasonably relevant to the brake and
steering defects claimed on the type of machine in question.
Discovery indicated that only a machine made during a relatively
limited period of time had brake and steering systems sufficiently
similar to the one involved in this case to be relevant to the
type of defects claimed.
Interrogatories were unsuccessful and the depositions of
Messrs. Black and Conrad were also unsuccessful.

It should be

noted that the discovery of Clark on that particular machine in
question indicated several brake defects including one prior to
the time the machine was sold brand new where the local dealer
changed the brake linings to a softer lining, stating that he
was doing that on all 175A machines.

Clark's only

obj~ction

in

their answers to interrogatories were that such production and
inspection would be unduly burdensome.

Yet, plaintiffs offered

to inspect those records, they offered to rent or provide their
own microfilm viewer since Clark claimed they only had one; rent
or provide their own office space, since Clark claimed they had
no space; and further offered to pay the burden of all costs of
reproducing those materials.

It was further pointed out to the

court that reservations as to the admissibility on any documents
discovered would be reserved for later decision by the trial court.
Clark offered no other explanation why they had to be there
other than if plaintiff was going to be there, counsel for Clark
was going to be there also.

Nor were there any reasons advanced

why ?laintiffs should not only bear the expense of their own agents
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-22inspecting those records but also attorney for Clark being
there since the records disclosed were voluminous.

A consider-

able period of time, perhaps a week or more, would be requirec
to inspect all of the records.

The expense involved - that

1,.

paying Clark $70.00 an hour for their attorney, effectively
prevented plaintiffs' discovery of these records.
Limitations, if any, on discovery are made in the

form~

a protective order pursuant to Rule 26 (c) which provides in pe:
tinent part as follows:
•••• Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, and for good cause upon the
court in which the action is pending or alternatively,
on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the
district where the deposition is to be taken may make
any order which justice requires to protect a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of
the following:
(emphasis added)
2.

That the discovery may be had only on
specified terms and conditions, including designation of the time or place.

Nor is the discretion provided in Rule 26 to be exercised ligh:
In Blankenship v. Hearst Corporation, 519 F.2d 418

(Ca

9th,~

at 429, the court stated:
Under the liberal discovery principles of the
Federal Rules defendants were required to carry a
heavy burden of showing why discovery was denied.
Under the facts of the present case, the defendants made
showing whatsoever.
In re Penn. Cent. Securities Litigation, 560 F.2d 1128
(Ca 3, 1977) the court found it was not an abuse of discretio:,
to order the defendant to call out names and addresses even t~c
the computer program which would do that would cost the defend'
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-23some $16,000.00.

The court declined to shift, the burden of

that program to the plaintiffs.

In the present case,both plain-

tiffs and defendants would share the burden.

Under the court's

ruling plaintiffs would carry the entire burden including $70.00
per hour for Clark's attorneys.

There were no grounds advanced

why that should be done.
The trial court refused to rule on plaintiffs' motion for
attorney's fees and expenses in connection with several discovery
motions.

Neither of these discovery motions were opposed.

In

one, Clark did not appear at all and the order was granted.

In

the second, Clark merely stipulated they would answer and made no
objection.
Rule 37(a-4) provides in pertinent part as follows:
4. Award of Expenses of Motion.
If the motion
is granted, the court may, after opportunity for
hearing, require the party or the opponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion, or the party or
attorney advising such conduct, or both of them, to
pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses
incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's
fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to
the motion was substan~ially justified or that other
circumstances made an award of expenses unjust.
In plaintiffs' motion of July 18, 1977, they moved for an
award of $171.38 expenses plus $258.00 attorney's fees in connection with the motion of June 18, 1976, and for the sum of $250.00
attorney's fees in connection with the motion of May 9, 1977.
There was no opposition to either motion nor was there any rebuttal to argument that those expenses were not reasonably incurred and in fact the memorandums in support of the two motions
took substantially longer than those attorney's fees would justify.
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-24In Hurnphr ies Exterminating Co. , Inc. v. Poulter, 6 2 Frd.
392, the district court of Maryland awarded $250. 00 attorney's

fees of $25.00 an hour plus $17.00 train fare to attend the
motion and stated that the expenses would be awarded unless
the opposition was just.

Since there was no opposition the

court erred in failing to rule on plaintiffs' motion.

For

the reasons stated above, the district court's ruling should
be amended.
The court's failure to rule on plaintiffs' demand for pr:
duction made September 16, 1977, is analogous to the preventior
of discovery described above and relates to some of the sarne
documents and also prevented plaintiffs from access to the onl;
records available and relevant to the defects in the machine

~

volved in this case.
POINT V.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BASED ON THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE REVERSED SINCE FILING
THE ACTION WITHIN TWO YEARS AS PROVIDED BY THE
UTAH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SECTION 78-12-28,
U.C.A. (1953 AS AMENDED) IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT, NOR A LIMITATION UPON THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATH, BUT IS MERELY
A LIMITATION UPON THE REMEDY WHICH IS TOLLED BY
REASON OF INFANCY OR OTHER DISABILITY.
As previously pointed out, defendants Clark and ReynoNs
are barred from asserting the statute of limitations for failur:
to properly bring the matter to the court's attention in a time
and appropriate manner.

Even had they done so, would be to ask

the court to accept new and sweeping doctrine which is incor.s1s·
tent with the general laws of the United States, the laws of tf,,
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-25state of Utah, and in particular, recent decisions of this Court.
To hold that the statute of limitations ran against the five
minor Switzer children two years after their father's death when
the respective ages were between two years and eight and one-half
years, and when there had never been a guardian ad litem or a
general guardian appointed in their behalf, would deprive each
of them of a vested right in this cause of

action~

resulting in a

denial of due process and equal protection and would be contrary
to the clear and unambiguous language of Section 78-12-36(1),
U.C.A.

(1953, as amended) which provides:
Effect of Disability.
If the person entitled to
bring an action other than for the recovery of real
property is at the time the cause of action accrued
either:
(1)

Under the age of majority; or •

The time of such disability is not a part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action.
The simple, complete and conclusive answer to this contention is found in the very recent decision of this court in Scott
v. School Board of Granite School District, 568 P. 2d 746
(Utah 1977).

That case involved a high school student who was

injured during a shop class while a minor.

The student by and

through his guardian ad litem brought suit against the school
district but the district court granted summary judgment because
the student failed to meet the 90-day notice requirements of
63-30-13.

In that case, this court cited the infant-tolling

provision in Section 78-12-36(1) and stated that:
A minor is incapable of giving notice by
the very virtue of his minority, nor may he
bring an action in his own behalf while a minor.
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He simply has no standing by statute and an action
by or against a minor requires the appointment of
a guardian ad litem.
The parents, or natural guardians, have no
specific legal duty to perform and have no responsibility to their minor off-spring other than
their moral obligation. Consequently, in matters
of this kind, when a parent, natural guardian,
fails for one reason or another to give notice,
file suit, or otherwise protect the minor's legal
interests, the minor is left completely without a
remedy. This was undoubtedly one of the prime
considerations which prompted the legislature to
toll the statute during the minority of a claimant against municipalities. Their reason for
not so providing in governmental irranunity cases
as we are faced with here is entirely unclear
However, the general legislative intent to protect the causes of minors is abundantly clear
by said amendment and the specific provisions of
the general statute of limitations.
(568 P.2d at 747-8) (emphasis added).
Then, with a 4 to 1 majority held that:
Notwithstanding the prior pronouncements of this
court, a minor claimant is justly entitled to the
protection afforded by said Section 78-12-36(1)
U.C.A., 1953, in all cases including notice requirements of the type contained in the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. To hold otherwise is a denial of due
process and equal protection.
Applying the decision reached in Scott to the facts of
our case, it would be hard not to cone 1 ude that the infant toll.
provisions of Section 78-12-36 (1)

tolled the statute of lirnita·

tions as against the minor Switzer children.

(Emphasis added)

Moreover, there was no general guardian or guardian ad
litem appointed for the minor children until this action was
commenced.

Therefore, there was no person who could properly

bring the action on their behalf.
There are several classifications of guardians.

Tradit'.c

the natural parent has been referred to as a natural guardian•·
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-27inherent rights to custody and with certain parental rights and
duties with regard to the care of their children.

Natural guardiano-.,

however, have no right to interfere with the infant's person or
property or to bring an action for and in behalf of a minor without
statutory court approval.
Title 75-13-3, Utah Code Annotated, before amendment, provided
in pertinent part as follows:
Guardians of property must be appointed by court.
No
person whether a parent or other person, shall have any
power as a guardian of property except by appointment as
hereinafter provided.
The statute then provided for appointment of general guardians
of the personal property of minors and guardian ad litem to defend
the interests of any minor interested in any suit or matter pending
therein.

See Titles 75-13-5, 75-13-8, 75-13-12, Utah Code Annotated

1953.
Clearly, a general guardian or guardian ad litem would have
the necessary statutory authority to bring an action for and in
behalf of minor children for the recovery of damages for the
wrongful death of their father under Title 78-11-7, Utah Code
Annotated 1953.
The state of law in this regard has been preserved in the
Utah Uniform Probate Code, Title 75-5-201, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
Status of Guardian of Minor. - General. A person becomes a guardian of a minor by acceptance of a testamentary appointment or upon appointment by the court.
The guardianship status continues until terminated,
without regard to the location from time to time of
the guardian and minor ward.
(Emphasis added)
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-28It is clear that Mrs. Bowles was a natural mother, a na'.
or parental guardian with rights of custody and control,

b~~

not appointed a general guardian or guardian ad li tern with aut·
to bring an action in behalf of the minor children until Octob'
1974, when this action was commenced.

She clearly had no rigt:

bring an action on the children's behalf for damages for the

,,~

death of their father.
Moreover, it is clear that without specific legislative.
the right to commence an action vested in the minor children s:
not be abrogated.

Utah Constitution, Article XVI, Sec. 5, reac

pertinent part as follows:
The right of action to recover damages for injuries
resulting in death shall never be abrogated.
With specific regard to wrongful death actions, this cour
has held in Seely v. Cowley, 12 Ut.2d 252; 365 P.2d 63, and Pla
v. International Smelting Corporation, 61 Ut.

342, 213 P. 187.

that the statute of limitations for wrongful death cases is not
limitation upon liability but only a lirni ta ti on upon the rerned,,
and that consequently an action for wrongful death may be brouq'
after the two-year period when there is an applicable statute
tolling the running of the limitation period.

(Emphasis added)

In Platz, supra, the court held that the statute of
limitations was tolled in a wrongful death case where the he~
a resident of the Kingdom of Hungary, pursuant to the tolling
statute, Section 78-12-39 U.C.A.

(1953, as amended), which pro·

vides that the statute of limitations is tolled when the perso:
is an alien subject or a citaizen of another country at war ~~
the United States.

In Seely, supra, the court held that the
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-29statute of limitations in a wrongful death case was tolled by
section 78-12-35 U.C.A.

(1953, as amended), which provides that

absence of a defendant from the state tolls the statute.

In

Seely the court stated:
The question to be determined is whether respondent's
absence from the state tolled the provision of Section
78-12-28, since there is no doubt the only action by
appellant not heretofore voluntarily dismissed by her
was commenced more than two years after the death of
appellant's husband.
It is respondent's contention that the provisions
of Section 78-12-35 do not apply to a personal representative because the limitation of Section 78-12-28(2)
commences to run even though no administrator is appointed for the wrongdoer's estate. These cases held
that the limitation of the time in which an action
in wrongful death could be commenced was a limitation
upon the liability as well as upon the remedy, and,
therefore, the period of time in which the action could
be commenced could not be extended even though no administrator had been appointed. • •
It is the appellant's contention that since an
administratrix was appointed for the wrongdoer's estate
that her absence from the state tolled the limitations
of the statute just as such absence would have if the
suit was against the wrongdoer instead of his estate.
As authority that our court has not held like the
authorities upon which respondent relies, that the
liability as well as the remedy is limited to a two
year period. Appellant cites Platz v. International
Smelting Company.
In that case, the court held that
the statute which tolled the running of the statute of
limitations in favor of an alien enemy likewise tolled
it against the personal representative of the deceased.
We are, therefor, inclined to view that that respondent's authorities are of no aid in determining
our question.
Had the two-year limitation in a wrongful death action been considered by this court to be
a limitation upon the liability as well as the remedy,
the alien heir would have been precluded from bringing
her action after the two-year period even though there
was a statute tolling the running of the time in favor
of an alien enemy.
(365 P.2d at p 64). (Emphasis added)
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The Platz and Seely cases make it abundantly clear that
the commencement of a wrongful death action in the two-year
period is not a condition precedent nor a limitation upon the
right to maintain such an action and the statute of limitations
in Section 78-12-28 (_2) can be tolled by applicable tolling provisions.
The Platz and Seely decisions are amply supported by anal
of the pertinent Utah statutes and the weight of authority elsE·
where.
The Utah wrongful death statute is found in Chapter 11 o'
the Utah Code Annotated (1953) being Section 78-11-7.

This sec·

tion does not set forth any time within which the action must

~

commenced.
The statute of limitations is set forth in a separate sta·
tute, which is Section 78-12-28, in Chapter 12 of the Utah Code
tated (1953).

Chapter 12 is headed "Limitation of

Actions,"~

Section 78-12-1 of that chapter reads as follows:
Time for commencement of actions generally.
Civil
actions can be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action
shall have accrued, except where in special cases a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.
Section 78-12-28 of Chapter 12 provides in pertinent
part as follows:
Within Two Years. - . . . (2) An action to recover
damages for the death of one caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another.
Therefore, it is clear that the two year limitation
period for the cormnencement of wrongful death actions appears
in the chapter of the Code which prescribes the time for commencement of actions generally.

The section also applies to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-31actions other than those for wrongful death.

It is purely a

statute of limitations which affects the remedy and does not
condition or limit the right to recover for wrongful death which
is created by Section 78-11-7 of Chapter 11.

Hence, Section

78-12-28 is subject to another statute set forth in Chapter 12,
which tolls the limitation period in favor of minors, viz. Section 78-12-36, U.C.A.

(Emphasis added)

Appellant contends that since the statute of limitations
is found at present and in its previous form in the same chapter
as the disability tolling statute for minors, they should be construed together.

Thus, the remedy is controlled by the statute

of limitations but includes and is controlled by the tolling provisions relating to the disability of minors.

The Utah Supreme

Court has previously held other tolling provisions of Title 78,
Chapter 12, U.C.A.

(1953, as amended) to apply to the wrongful

death statute of limitations.

(See Seely v. Cowley, 365 P.2d 63

(Ut 1961) and Platz v. International Smelting Company, 213 P. 187
(Utah 1922).

(Emphasis added)

Since the tolling section (78-12-36 U.C.A.) specifically
provides that it applies to all types of action other than for
the recovery of real property, it must follow that it also applies
to a wrongful death action.
Through clear, unambiguous language, the legislature provided that the statute of limitations is tolled for a person who
was a minor at the time and when the cause of action accrued.
The United States Supreme Court seems to recognize this
fact in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) describing the effects
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-32of Section 15-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 amended upon Utah law.

The cour:

said:
This is not to say that § 15-1-1 does not have
important effect in application. A "minor" may
disaffirm his contracts. §15-2-2.
An "infant" must
appear in courr by guardian or guardian ad litem.
Utah Rule Civ Proc 17(b). A parent has a right of
action for injury to, or wrongful death of, " a
minor child." §78-11-6. A person "[u]nder the age
of majority" is not competent or entitled to serve
as an administrator of a decedent's estate, §75-4-4,
or as the executor of a decedent's will. §75-3-15(1).
The statute of limitations is tolled while a person
entitled to bring an action is "[u] nder the age of
majority." §78-12-36. Thus, the distinction drawn
by §15-2-1 affects other rights and duties.
It has
pervasive effect, both direct and collateral.
(421 U.S. at 17) (emphasis added)
It is evident that as the legislature approached Section
78-12-36 they had the intent to treat a person who is under the
age of majority as having a disability and specifically provide'
for the tolling of the statute of limitations.

(See Scott, supr

The statute is not just a random section of the code, but is

p~

of an entire chapter which deals exclusively with the laws gave:
ing the statute of limitations for causes of action in the Sta:'
of Utah.

There has been no significant amendments to Title 78,

Chapter 12, in the period from 1953 to the present indicating

t

legislature's approval and satisfaction with the statute.
However, in 1973, the Utah Legislature amended Section
10-7-77, U.C.A., 1953, as it pertains to minors by adding the
following:
If the person for whom a claim is made is a
mino=, then the claims covered by this section
may be so presented within the time limits specified above or within one year after the person
reaching the age of majority, whichever is longer.
(See 568 P.2d at 747).
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-33The

~

and Seely cases are not only sound decisions but

are in accord with the weight of authority.

In holding that

limitation of action is subject to all _exceptions? 132 A.L.R.
292 provides in pertinent part at page 310:
• • • where the limitation applicable to a wrongful death statute or a survival statute allowing
damages for death is a provision of the general
statute of limitations, it is subject to all the
implied and express exceptions applicable thereto.
(emphasis added)
This annotation collects and cites cases from many jurisdictions and includes the Platz case.
The general law on this point is also well stated in Corpus
Juris Secundum:
In many jurisdictions by express statutory enactment, or by judicial construction, where the statute
excepts persons laboring under disabilities from its
operation, even if not mentioning infants specifically,
infants are within the saving clause of the statute, if
it is purely a statute of limitations, affecting the
remedy and not the right, and the statute does not run
against them during such disability, even where such
infant has a guardian or trustee who might maintain the
action in the infant's name, provided the title or right
of action is in the infant.
(54 C.J.S., Limitations of
Actions, Section 235) (emphasis added)
This reasoning is further strengthened by the reasoning of
the long-standing precedent case of Brookshire v. Burkhart, 283 P.
571 (Oklahoma 1929).

In that case the court held that since the

death statute was in the same chapter with the limitation of
actions in general, which was created by the same legislature at
the same time, the limitation period prescribed by the death
statute was an ordinary statute of limitations and that a general
saving provision pertaining to legal disability was applicable to
extend the time limi ta ti on.
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-34This argument under the Utah statutes is even stronger
because of the fact that the right to sue for wrongful death
in an entirely different chapter than the statute of

10

-----

limita~:

and the disability provisions which are in the same chapter.
In Texas Utilities Co. v. West, 59

s.w.

2d 459

(Tex. Ch,

App. 1933) the court considered a case similar to the one at ha
In that case the plaintiff brought suit individually and as thE
legally appointed guardian on behalf of her two children for t:'
wrongful death of their father, D. F. West.

Mr. West died on

September 30, 1927 and the suit was not brought until January:.
1931.

The lower court held the two-year statute of limitations

had run against the mother individually, but regarding the su1:
on behalf of the minors, the court held:
The cause of action arising from the death of
their father was a property right or an asset belonging to the minor plaintiffs, and the trial
court held correctly that the suit of the minor
plaintiffs was not barred by the limitation. (59
S.W. 2d at 461)
(Emphasis added)
Thus the Texas Supreme Court viewed the right of the mine:
plaintiffs to sue through a guardian ad litem as a vested prope:
right or asset and was not barred by the statute of limitations.
See also Buss v. Robison,

255 S.W. 2d 339

(Tex. Civ. App.

1952) which cites Texas Utilities Co., supra, and holds that th'
Texas 2-year statute of limitations for wrongful death actions not bar the cause of action of the minors in that case.
There are other state supreme court decisions which al~
support to the Utah Supreme Court decisions in Scott, Seely, a;:
Platz, which appellants submit are controlling on this issue.
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-35In Cross v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 388 P.2d 353
(Cal. 1964) the California Supreme Court reversed a lower court
decision upon facts, statutes, and issues very similar to the
present case.

(Emphasis added)

In Cross, supra, a mother who had been appointed as
guardian for her three minor children, brought suit for the
wrongful death of their father, George Cross. Mr. Cross died
February 1956 and the suit was not brought until November 1961.
In California at that time, there was a one-year statute of
limitations for wrongful death actions contained in the wrongful
death act which was in Section 377 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure and the infant tolling provision was found in
Section 340.

In answer to the question:

Was the running of the statute of limitations for
wrongful death suspended during the period of plaintiff's minority? (388 P.2d at 345)
the court simply quoted the pertinent sections of their code
noted above, and held, yes.

Later, in the opinion, the court also

held:
The running of the statute of limitations against
adult heirs, therefore, does not effect the rights of
minor plaintiffs in a wrongful death action. (388 P.2d
at 354)
In Parker v. Chrysler Motors Corporation, 501 P.2d 111,
(Nev. 1972), the Supreme Court of Nevada followed the reasoning
of the California Supreme Court in Cross, supra.

The issue before

the court was whether the two-year statute of limitations for
wrongful death actions was a bar to an action commenced by the
decedent's widow as guardian ad litem for the minor heirs of the
decedent in view of the infant disability provision.

The court
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-36reversed the lower court's decision and in reference to the min:
that:
• • • It is equally clear that the running of the
statute of limitations is suspended during the period
of their minority. (NRS 11.250(1),(3)) (Emphasis added)
The California Supreme Court in Cross ~ac--G.
&_E.__92.,, 60 Cal. 2d 690, 36 Cal. Rptr. 321, 388
P.2d 353 (1964) rules on the very poings here presented and contrary to the view taken by our district
court. We choose to adopt the reasoning of the Cross
decision.
In Sprecher v. Magsj::adt,

213 N.W.2d 881

(North Dakota 197·

the plaintiff filed suit for the wrongful death of her husband,
Virgil Sprecher, for herself and as guardian ad li tern in behalf
her daughter, Kimberly, a minor.

Mr. Sprecher died on December.

1969, and the suit was not commenced until November 18, 1972. t
trial court held that the two-year statute of limitations for
wrongful death actions took precedence over the infant tolling
provisions and barred recovery of both the mother and child but
the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed, stating:
We conclude that the provisions of Section 28-01-15
prevail over the provisions of Section 28-01-18(4) and
that accordingly the time limitation prescribed in the
latter section is suspended during Kimerly's minority.
The summary judgment of the trial court dismissing
the complaint as it relates to Kimberly Dawn Sprecher
is reversed and the case is remanded for disposition
consistent with this opinion. (213 N.W.2d at 885)
(Emphasis added)
In Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972), the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts faced a case similar to the pre>'
one.

There the husband died on April 15, 1967, the action of~

surviving widow and three minor children was filed May 4, 1970,
and the statute of limitations was 2 years.

Al though Massachus;

had always interpreted its wrongful death statute of limitatioro
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-37Upon consideration of the Moragne decision
(Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S.
375) and the sound reasoning upon which it is
based, we are convinced that the law in this
Commonwealth has also evolved to the point where
it may now be held that the right to recovery for
wrongful death is of common law origin, and we so
hold.
(Emphasis added)

Consequently, our wrongful death statutes will
no longer be regarded as "creating the right" to
recovery for wrongful death.
We further hold that statutes limiting the period
for bringing actions for death are to be construed
in the same manner as the limitations contained
in G.L. c. 260, the general statute of limitations,
and that in appropriate cases they may be tolled
by the various provisions of G.L. c. 260.
284 N.E. 2d at 229, 331 -

(Citation added)

The court using the above reasoning held that the infant
tolling provision found in G. L. c 260 §7, tolled the statute of
limitations for the minors in that case and therefore reversed
the lower court's dismissal.
For other cases holding that there is a common law rjght to
a wrongful death action, see Barnette v. Butler Aviation International, Inc., 39 N.Y.S. 2d 348 (1977) and Weinraub v. International Banknote Company, Inc., 422 Fed. Sup. 856

(1976).

In Wilbon v. D. F. Bast Company, Inc., 365 N.E. 2d 498
(App. Crt. Ill 1977) the court in a wrongful death action held
that the two minor children were to be considered wards of the
court whose interest should be specifically protected.

The court

noted that the 2-year wrongful death statute of limitations is
found in Chapter 70, Section 2, and the infant tolling provision
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is found in Chapter 83, Section 11.
Then the court held:
It is an exercise in illogic to assume the legisenacted section 22 of chapter 83 and then
intended to negate it in chapter 70, section 2 . . .
(Emphasis added)
latur~

In order to be consistent, we must conclude it
is necessary for us to read chapter 83, section 11,
together with chapter 70 to reach a decision. ]Ne
believe the intent of the legislature to extend
the time to bring an action for persons under 18
years of age, as set forth in section 22 of the
Limitations Act, is controlling and overrides section 2 of Chapter 70, for reasons previously discussed. Therefore, we conclude the intent of the
legislature, the case law and the public policy
of Illinois, require that we reverse the decision
of the trial court and remand this case for trial
on the merits for the benefit of the two minor
children.
These rulings of the California Supreme Court, North
Dakota Supreme Court, Nevada Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, are consistent with the Utah cases of
Scott, Seely and Platz in support of the proposition that

t~

wrongful death statute of limitations is tolled by the plain ti:
cause of action for recovery.
From the foregoing reasons, the conclusion is inescapabh
that the Utah Statute of Limitations for wrongful death is an
ordinary statute of limitations.

It is not a condition of lire

tation of the right and is tolled during the minority of a pla:
tiff by the provision of Section 78-12-36, Utah Code Annotatec
1953.
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POINT VI.
PLAINTIFFS NEED NOT PLEAD FAILURE TO KEEP WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION IN EFFECT, BUT NEED ONLY PLEAD NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY.
In Plaintiffs' complaint it was never specifically alleged
that Reynolds failed to keep workmen's compensation insurance in
effect as provided by 35-1-46 U.C.A.

(1953 as amended).

Plaintiffs did allege, however, that Gordon J. Switzer was
employed by Reynolds and that his death occurred in the course
of his employment.

Plaintiffs' complaint in the first cause of

action provides in pertinent part, as follows:
3. That defendant BRYCE C. REYNOLDS is a resident
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and was formerly
doing business as Reynolds Sand and Gravel Company at
7600 South 20th East, Salt Lake County, Utah.
4. That said defendant employed Gordon J. Switzer,
now deceased, who was on the 24th day of June, 1963,
in the course of his employment, operating a 175A
Michigan tractor shovel machine in a westerly direction
in Parley's Canyon approximately 15 miles East of
Wasatch Boulevard in Salt Lake County, Utah. (Emphasis
added).
5. That the equipment furnished to the said Gordon
J. Switzer by the defendant Bryce c. Reynolds was defective, unsafe, inadequately designed, manufactured,
maintained and repaired, and said employee was directed
to drive the same on a steep downgrade over a distance
of approximately 20 miles and on a public highway,
contrary to the laws of the State of Utah.
In the answer of Reynolds served January 17, 1975, the
pertinent admissions to the first cause of action are as follows:
3.

Admits the allegations of paragraph 3.

4. Admits that Gordon J. Switzer, now deceased, was,
on the 24th day of June, 1963, employed by said defendant, and that on said date he operated a 175A Michigan
tractor shovel machine, but denies each and every other
allegation of paragraph 4.
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-40In October 1975 defendant Reynolds served certain
atories on the plaintiffs.

inter~

Interrogatory No. 1 provided:

1. State with particularity the exact act
or acts of negligence you claim were committed
by defendant Bryce C. Reynolds which resulted in
the liability claimed in your complaint.
Plaintiff served answers to said interrogatories and supp.
mented those answers on February 8, 1977.

Plaintiffs'answer t:

Interrogatory No. 1, above, was more than a page.

Subsection":

of that answer specifically states as follows:

J. Violation of Utah statute 41-6-111- Coasting
Prohibited;
41-6-144 - Vehicle in Unsafe Condition;
41-6-144 - Brake Equipment; 41-6-155 - Requirement
That Vehicle be in Safe Mechanical Condition; 35-1-12
- Places of Employment to be Safe; 35-1-46 - Failure
to Secure Compensation; 35-1-57 - Non-Compliance Penalty.
In view of the specific allegation in the complaint that
the injuries arose in the course of Gordon J. Switzer's employr;
and the specific answers to interrogatories referred to above,
Reynolds can hardly state that workmen's compensation was notr
issue in this case.
In view of the provision of Rule 8 (a) which provides onl'.·
that a claim shall state a short and plain statement of the ell.
and in view of the obvious knowledge of the parties that worJane·
compensation was an issue, the plaintiffs ought not to be requi:
to plead more fully and Reynolds can hardly claim surprise at

t

late date.
Through an abundence of caution, plaintiffs at the hell~
of September 16, 1977, moved to amend their complaint to speci'.
cally allege failure of defendant Reynolds to secure compensat:
The trial judge never denied that motion.
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-41The provision of Rule 15(a) which provides that leave to
~end

"shall be freely given when justice so requires" made it

a clear abuse of discretion for the trial judge to fail to rule
on that motion.

C 0 N C L U S I 0 N
Appellants respectfully submit that:
1.

There is a genuine issue of fact and the summary

judgment granted by the trial court should be set aside.
2.

The defendants should be estopped from raising the

defense of statute of limitations because of their failure to
raise and plead said defense in a timely manner and the judgment
of dismissal should be set aside.
3.

Plaintiffs' claim has not been discharged in bankruptcy

as to defendant Reynolds and ·the judgment of dismissal should be
set aside.
4.

Plaintiffs should be allowed reasonable discovery

without repressive payment of costs, expenses and counsel fees
and the court abused its discretion in failing to award plaintiffs costs and expenses in the depositions of its experts. The
trial court's judgment of dismissal should be set aside with
appropriate instructions.
5.

The plaintiffs' cause of action was tolled by reason

of their infancy and the judgment of summary judgment based upon
the statute of limitations is improper and should be reversed,
since the statute of limitations is not a condition precedent nor
a limitation upon the right to maintain an action for wrongful
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death and is merely a limitation upon the remedy which is
tolled by reason of infancy or other disability.
6.

Plaintiffs should not be required to plead

failure~

maintain workmen's compensation in effect, but rather should
only be required to plead negligence generally, but when a
motion to amend the complaint by the plaintiffs is made to
alleviate any question, it was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to fail to rule upon said motion.
Respectfully Submitted,
F

-
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